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Household Demand for Health Insurance: Price and Spouse's Coverage

Author

Listed:
  • Marjorie Honig

    (Hunter College, Department of Economics)

  • Irena Dushi

    (International Longevity Center-USA)

Abstract

Demand for employment-based insurance is typically treated as an individual rather than a household decision. Dual-earner households are now the modal U.S. married household, however, and most firms offer family coverage as an option available to employees. Findings from a model estimating married workers' take-up of their own insurance with their own and their spouses' offers indicate that both own price and potential coverage under spouses' plans are important determinants of take-up. We find evidence of selection into jobs offering insurance among wives but not husbands. Findings also suggest that dual-earners are not aware of the potential wage/benefit trade-off. Data are from the 1996 panel of SIPP.

Suggested Citation

  • Marjorie Honig & Irena Dushi, 2005. "Household Demand for Health Insurance: Price and Spouse's Coverage," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 411, Hunter College Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:htr:hcecon:411
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    File URL: http://econ.hunter.cuny.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/RePEc/papers/HunterEconWP411.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ji-Liang Shiu & Meng-Chi Tang, 2016. "Household Preferences and Joint Decisions on Employer-Provided Health Insurance Access," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 84(6), pages 723-748, December.
    2. Royalty, Anne Beeson & Abraham, Jean M., 2006. "Health insurance and labor market outcomes: Joint decision-making within households," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1561-1577, September.
    3. Laura Bucila, 2008. "Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Minimum Wage," Working Papers 0812, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    4. Boyle, Melissa A. & Lahey, Joanna N., 2016. "Spousal labor market effects from government health insurance: Evidence from a veterans affairs expansion," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 63-76.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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