Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and a Possible Role for the WTO
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- Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007.
"Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1794-1823, December.
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Cited by:
- Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2009.
"Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements,"
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- Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2009. "Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1735, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Staiger, Robert & Maggi, Giovanni, 2009. "Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 7527, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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JEL classification:
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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