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Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and a Possible Role for the WTO

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  • Park, Jee-Hyeong

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  • Park, Jee-Hyeong, 2009. "Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and a Possible Role for the WTO," CCES Discussion Paper Series 19, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:ccesdp:19
    Note: First Draft: June 2004; Revised: February, 2009
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    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/17289/070ccesDP_19.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1794-1823, December.
    2. Park, Jee-Hyeong, 2000. "International trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 473-495, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2009. "Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 15460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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