A Mechanism Design for a Solution to the Tragedy of Commons
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Other versions of this item:
- Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2008. "Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(4), pages 253-270, February.
References listed on IDEAS
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 294-320, November.
- Kranich, Laurence, 1994. "Equal Division, Efficiency, and the Sovereign Supply of Labor," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 178-189, March.
- Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994.
"Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Roemer John E. & Silvestre Joaquim, 1993. "The Proportional Solution for Economies with Both Private and Public Ownership," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 426-444, April.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2007.
"Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 85-106, September.
- Yamada, Akira & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2006. "Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economics with unequal labor skill," Discussion Paper Series a475, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Naoki Yoshihara & Akira Yamada, 2019.
"Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 113-134, June.
- Naoki Yoshihara & Akira Yamada, 2018. "Nash Implementation in Production Economies with Unequal Skills: A Characterization," Working Papers SDES-2018-18, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Dec 2018.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 1997. "Double Implementation by a Simple Game Form in the Commons Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 205-213, November.
- Naoki Yoshihara & Akira Yamada, 2019.
"Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 113-134, June.
- Naoki Yoshihara & Akira Yamada, 2018. "Nash Implementation in Production Economies with Unequal Skills: A Characterization," Working Papers SDES-2018-18, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Dec 2018.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 294-320, November.
- Kaname Miyagishima, 2015. "Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(3), pages 247-257, September.
- Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004.
"Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, April.
- Murat R. Sertel & Remzi Sanver, 2001. "Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners," Working Papers 0107, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
- Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra, 2005.
"Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth,"
Microeconomics
0504008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra, 2016. "Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1606, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013.
"Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments,"
MPRA Paper
48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments," Discussion Paper Series 592, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Torregrosa, Ramón J., 2018. "On the endogenous determination of the degree of meritocracy in large cooperatives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 41-45.
- Roberto Veneziani & Luca Zamparelli & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017.
"A Progress Report On Marxian Economic Theory: On The Controversies In Exploitation Theory Since Okishio (1963),"
Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(5), pages 1421-1448, December.
- Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "A Progress Report on Marxian Economic Theory: On the Controversies in Exploitation Theory since Okishio (1963)," Discussion Paper Series 632, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Naoki Yoshihara, 2016. "A progress report on Marxian economic theory: On the controversies in exploitation theory since Okishio (1963)," Working Papers SDES-2016-3, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Apr 2016.
- Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "A Progress Report on Marxian Economic Theory: On the Controversies in Exploitation Theory since Okishio (1963)," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2016-06, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012.
"Nash implementation with partially honest individuals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," Economic Research Papers 271188, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Hervé Moulin & Yves Sprumont, 2007.
"Fair allocation of production externalities : recent results,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 117(1), pages 7-36.
- MOULIN, Hervé & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2005. "Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results," Cahiers de recherche 28-2005, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- SPRUMONT, Yves & MOULIN, Hervé, 2005. "Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results," Cahiers de recherche 2005-22, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April.
- Biung†Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno†Ternero, 2017.
"Fair Allocation Of Disputed Properties,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1279-1301, November.
- JU, Biung-Ghi & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan, 2014. "Fair allocation of disputed properties," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno Ternero, 2017. "Fair allocation of disputed properties," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2913, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2016. "Fair Allocation of Disputed Properties," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2016-10, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2015. "Fair Allocation of Disputed Properties," Working Papers 15.13, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Cabrales, Antonio, 1999.
"Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 159-184, June.
- Antonio Cabrales, "undated". "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," ELSE working papers 009, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Antonio Cabrales, 1996. "Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information," Economics Working Papers 179, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
Elsevier.
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
- Hagiwara, Makoto, 2018. "A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 51-53.
- Jonathan F. Cogliano & Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara, 2019.
"Exploitation, skills, and inequality,"
Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 77(2), pages 208-249, April.
- Jonathan F. Cogliano & Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "Exploitation, skills, and inequality," Working Paper Series 2018-01, Dickinson College, Department of Economics.
- Cogliano, Jonathan F. & Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018. "Exploitation, Skills, and Inequality," Discussion Paper Series 683, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Jonathan Cogliano & Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "Exploitation, skills, and inequality," Working Papers SDES-2018-14, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2018.
- Jonathan F. Cogliano & Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "Exploitation, skills, and inequality," Working Papers 849, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Sanjay Srivastava, 1996.
"A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 23-38.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Sanjay Srivastava, 1992. "Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems," Discussion Papers 1004, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Yoshihara, Naoki & Veneziani, Roberto, 2018.
"The Theory Of Exploitation As The Unequal Exchange Of Labour,"
Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 381-409, November.
- Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2016. "The Theory of Exploitation as the Unequal Exchange of Labour," Discussion Paper Series 652, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "The theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour," Working Papers SDES-2018-9, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2018.
- Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "The theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour," Working Papers 824, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018. "The Theory of Exploitation as the Unequal Exchange of Labour," Discussion Paper Series 678, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "The theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2017-04, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Ju, Biung-Ghi & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2018.
"Entitlement Theory Of Justice And End-State Fairness In The Allocation Of Goods,"
Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 317-341, November.
- Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2016. "Entitlement theory of justice and end-state fairness in the allocation of goods," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2016-14, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2017. "Entitlement theory of justice and end-state fairness in the allocation of goods," Working Papers 17.11, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2018. "Entitlement theory of justice and end-state fairness in the allocation of goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2989, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Hiromichi Miyake (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iehitjp.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.