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The Gender Division of Labor: A Joint Marriage and Job Search Model

Author

Listed:
  • Keisuke Kawata

    (Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation, Hiroshima University)

  • Mizuki Komura

    (Nagoya University)

Abstract

This paper develops a model combining marriage and the job search, including marital bargaining and wage posting. It considers two types of jobs, full-time and part-time, and workers, male and female. After job-worker matching, male and female individuals find one another in the marriage market. This model has multiple equilibria in terms of gender divisions of labor, and the equilibrium market tightness is socially inefficient because of externalities arising from the expected gains from marriage.

Suggested Citation

  • Keisuke Kawata & Mizuki Komura, 2015. "The Gender Division of Labor: A Joint Marriage and Job Search Model," IDEC DP2 Series 5-1, Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC).
    • Handle: RePEc:hir:idecdp:5-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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