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Building the Family Nest: Pre-Marital Investments, Marriage Markets and Spousal Allocations

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  • Iyigun, Murat

    (University of Colorado, Boulder)

  • Walsh, Randall P.

    (University of Colorado, Boulder)

Abstract

We develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by pre-marital investments, the marriage market is characterized by assortative matching, and endogenously-determined sharing rules form the basis of intra-household allocations. By incorporating pre-marital investments and spousal matching into the collective household model, we are able to identify the fundamental determinants of endogenously determined and maritally sustainable intra-marital sharing rules. In particular, we find that all sharing rules along the assortative order support unconditionally efficient outcomes where both pre-marital investments and intra-household allocations are efficient. The efficiency of both pre-marital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of pre-marital endowments and the sex ratios in the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Iyigun, Murat & Walsh, Randall P., 2005. "Building the Family Nest: Pre-Marital Investments, Marriage Markets and Spousal Allocations," IZA Discussion Papers 1752, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1752
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage; bargaining; household labor supply; collective model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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