IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/pocoec/v29y2017i2p198-215.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Oil explains all: desirable organisation of the Russian fuel markets (on the data of three waves of antitrust cases against oil companies)

Author

Listed:
  • Svetlana Avdasheva
  • Svetlana Golovanova

Abstract

This article considers the mutual influence of antitrust enforcement in the petroleum product markets and competition legislation in Russia. An analysis of infringement decisions by the Russian competition authority allows us to understand the perceived goals of economic policy in this sector. The shift from antitrust investigations and infringement decisions to a very specific set of remedies is explained by the desire to maintain low retail prices under increasing concentration without price subsidisation or promotion of entry at the refining stage of the value chain. The article highlights the specific use of antitrust legislation to maintain low fuel prices and support independent retailing companies. We also note the limitation this policy faces. The goals and effects of antitrust enforcement in the industry explain, in turn, the specific path of competition legislation development in Russia.

Suggested Citation

  • Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova, 2017. "Oil explains all: desirable organisation of the Russian fuel markets (on the data of three waves of antitrust cases against oil companies)," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 198-215, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:pocoec:v:29:y:2017:i:2:p:198-215
    DOI: 10.1080/14631377.2016.1267971
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/14631377.2016.1267971
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/14631377.2016.1267971?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cheon, Andrew & Urpelainen, Johannes & Lackner, Maureen, 2013. "Why do governments subsidize gasoline consumption? An empirical analysis of global gasoline prices, 2002–2009," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 382-390.
    2. Joseph Farrell & Michael Katz, 2006. "The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
    3. Svetlana Avdasheva & Andrei Shastitko, 2011. "Russian anti-trust policy: power of enforcement versus quality of rules," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 493-505, June.
    4. Robert Porter, 2005. "Detecting Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 26(2), pages 147-167, December.
    5. Thomas Hoehn, 2010. "Structure Versus Conduct - A Comparison of the National Merger Remedies Practice in Seven European Countries," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 9-32.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Svetlana Avdasheva & Dina Korneeva, 2017. "Why Enforcement against Excessive Pricing in the Russian Federation is not Sufficiently Successful?," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 5, pages 117-133.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jovanovic, Dragan & Wey, Christian, 2012. "An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers," DICE Discussion Papers 64, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. McCulloch, Neil & Natalini, Davide & Hossain, Naomi & Justino, Patricia, 2022. "An exploration of the association between fuel subsidies and fuel riots," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    3. Russell Pittman, 2007. "Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement," EAG Discussions Papers 200709, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    4. Kenneth Heyer, 2014. "Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages 19-32.
    5. Yasunori Ouchida & Daisaku Goto, 2016. "Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 324-331, March.
    6. V. Bageri & Y. Katsoulacos, 2017. "The market power requirement in antitrust enforcement and its usefulness," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 44(2), pages 145-159, June.
    7. Herbert Hovenkamp, 2011. "Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 39(1), pages 3-18, August.
    8. Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2011. "Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(1), pages 99-125, January.
    9. Barros, Pedro & Nilssen, Tore & Hoernig, Steffen, 2008. "Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competition Authority Among Sectoral Regulators," CEPR Discussion Papers 6861, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Andrei Y. Shastitko & Svetlana V. Golovanova, 2014. "Collusion in markets characterized by one large buyer: lessons learned from an antitrust case in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 49/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    11. Svetlana Avdasheva & Dina Tsytsulina & Svetlana Golovanova & Yelena Sidorova, 2015. "Discovering the Miracle of Large Numbers of Antitrust Investigations in Russia: The Role of Competition Authority Incentives," HSE Working papers WP BRP 26/PA/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    12. Andrey V. Makarov, 2014. "Comparative Analusis Of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion In Some Transition Economies: Challenges For Effectiveness," HSE Working papers WP BRP 20/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    13. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2022. "Licensing in a Stackelberg industry, product differentiation, and welfare," MPRA Paper 114181, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Yaseen GHULAM, 2018. "The Impact Of Reforms And Privatization On Firms’ Conduct In The Presence Of Interconnected Conglomerates And Weak And Inefficient Regulatory Institutions," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(4), pages 599-622, December.
    15. Youping Li, 2017. "Differential Pricing in Intermediate Good Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 585-596, September.
    16. Harrison, Mark, 2011. "Forging success: Soviet managers and accounting fraud, 1943-1962," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 43-64, March.
    17. Ciliberto, Federico & Williams, Jonathan, 2010. "Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conjectural Parameters in the Airline Industry," MPRA Paper 24888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. de Mesnard, Louis, 2009. "Is the French mobile phone cartel really a cartel?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 663-677, December.
    19. Чернявский Денис // Chernyavskiy Denis & Сейдахметов Ансар // Seidakhmetov Ansar, 2023. "Влияние повышения цен на горюче-смазочные материалы (ГСМ) на инфляцию: опыт Казахстана. // The impact of the increase in prices for fuels and lubricants on inflation: the experience of Kazakhstan," Working Papers #2023-6, National Bank of Kazakhstan.
    20. Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics 16179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:pocoec:v:29:y:2017:i:2:p:198-215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/CPCE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.