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Wage Bargaining and Turnover Costs with Heterogeneous Labour: The No-screening Case

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  • Strand, J.

Abstract

We study the effects of mobility costs in a model of wage bargaining between workers and firms, where there is instantaneous matching, free firm entry, heterogeneous labour, and workers' individual productivities are discovered by firms only after being hired. We derive the employment level and the minimum quality standard, in the market solution and in the socially efficient solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Strand, J., 1998. "Wage Bargaining and Turnover Costs with Heterogeneous Labour: The No-screening Case," Memorandum 14/1998, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1998_014
    as

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    File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/1998/Memo-14-1998.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Mortensen, Dale & Pissarides, Christopher, 2011. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
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    7. Strand, Jon, 1987. "Unemployment as a Discipline Device with Heterogeneous Labor [Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device]," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 489-493, June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    WAGES ; BARGAINING ; LABOUR MARKET;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion

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