Ex Post Efficiency and Individual Rationality in Incentive Compatible Trading Mechanisms
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Keywords
Efficient trading; mechanism design.;JEL classification:
- O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
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