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Welfare Implications of Peer Punishment in Unequal Societies

Author

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  • Visser, Martine

    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

Abstract

We show that peer sanctioning increases cooperation in public goods experiments more in unequally endowed groups than in equally endowed groups. Punishment results in a redistribution of wealth from high to low endowment players within groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Visser, Martine, 2006. "Welfare Implications of Peer Punishment in Unequal Societies," Working Papers in Economics 218, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0218
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2695
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Amartya Sen, 2003. "Journal of Economic Inequality," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 1(1), pages 1-1, April.
    2. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews & Okomboli Ong’ong’a, 2004. "Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 407-429, October.
    3. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    4. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
    5. Matthias Cinyabuguma & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2004. "On Perverse and Second-Order Punishment in Public Goods Experiments with Decentralized Sanctioning," Working Papers 2004-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    6. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2002. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 419-436, November.
    7. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Breier & Martine Visser, 2006. "Community‐Based Provision Of Development Services In Rural South Africa1," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 74(2), pages 301-314, June.
    2. Visser, Martine & Burns, Justine, 2006. "Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers in Economics 219, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inequality; cooperation; punishment; public goods; welfare and poverty; social norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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