INVESTMENT FOR GROWTH – a comparative study of firm performance in Scandinavia and South East Asia
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Per-Olof Bjuggren & Johan Eklund & Daniel Wiberg, 2007.
"Ownership structure, control and firm performance: the effects of vote-differentiated shares,"
Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(16), pages 1323-1334.
- Bjuggren, Per-Olof & Eklund, Johan & Wiberg, Daniel, 2005. "Ownership Structure, Control and Firm Performance: The Effects of Vote Differentiated Shares," Ratio Working Papers 71, The Ratio Institute.
- Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
"A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Scholarly Articles 30728046, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tore Sandven, "undated". "Corporate Governance: Theoretical Background and Implications for the Analysis of Corporate Governance in Norway," STEP Report series 200213, The STEP Group, Studies in technology, innovation and economic policy.
- Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Palmberg, Johanna, 2012. "Family Control and Executive Compensation," Ratio Working Papers 186, The Ratio Institute.
- Eklund, Johan E. & Palmberg, Johanna & Wiberg, Daniel, 2010.
"Family Ownership and Returns on Investment – Founders, Heirs, and External Managers,"
Ratio Working Papers
148, The Ratio Institute.
- Johanna Palmberg & Johan Eklund & Daniel Wiberg, 2011. "Family Ownership and Return on Investments - Founders, Heirs and External Managers," ERSA conference papers ersa10p1517, European Regional Science Association.
- Johan Eklund & Johanna Palmberg & Daniel Wiberg, 2013. "Inherited corporate control and returns on investment," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 419-431, August.
- Randall Morck, 2011.
"Finance and Governance in Developing Economies,"
Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
- Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," NBER Working Papers 16870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schmid, Thomas & Ampenberger, Markus & Kaserer, Christoph & Achleitner, Ann-Kristin, 2010. "Controlling shareholders and payout policy: do founding families have a special 'taste for dividends'?," CEFS Working Paper Series 2010-01, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
- Erbetta, Fabrizio & Menozzi, Anna & Corbetta, Guido & Fraquelli, Giovanni, 2013. "Assessing family firm performance using frontier analysis techniques: Evidence from Italian manufacturing industries," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 106-117.
- Patrice Charlier & Céline Duboys, 2011. "Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 14(1), pages 5-31., March.
- Hamadi, Malika & Heinen, Andréas, 2015.
"Firm performance when ownership is very concentrated: Evidence from a semiparametric panel,"
Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 172-194.
- M. Hamadi & A. Heinen, 2015. "Firm Performance when Ownership is very Concentrated: Evidence from a Semiparametric Panel," Working Paper CRENoS 201502, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Andreas Heinen & M. Hamadi, 2015. "Firm Performance when Ownership is very Concentrated: Evidence from a Semiparametric Panel," Post-Print hal-02979991, HAL.
- San Martin-Reyna, J.M. & Duran-Encalada, Jorge A., 2012. "The relationship among family business, corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from the Mexican stock exchange," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 106-117.
- Croci, Ettore & Gonenc, Halit & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2012. "CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in Continental Europe," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3318-3335.
- Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2010. "Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism," NBER Working Papers 16490, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Patrice Charlier & Céline Du Boys, 2011. "Family governance and payout policies to shareholders [Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires]," Post-Print hal-01470330, HAL.
- Forcillo, Donato, 2017. "Codetermination: the Necessary Presence of Workers on the Board. A Mathematical Model," MPRA Paper 81935, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Amitava Roy, 2016. "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: A Study of Indian Listed Firms," Metamorphosis: A Journal of Management Research, , vol. 15(1), pages 31-46, June.
- Ducassy, Isabelle & Guyot, Alexis, 2017. "Complex ownership structures, corporate governance and firm performance: The French context," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 291-306.
- Malika Hamadi & Ronald W. Anderson, 2009. "Large powerful shareholders and cash holding," LSF Research Working Paper Series 09-04, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
- Andrea Melis & Silvia Carta & Silvia Gaia, 2012. "Executive remuneration in blockholder-dominated firms. How do Italian firms use stock options?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(3), pages 511-541, August.
- Nadia Saghi-Zedek & Amine Tarazi, 2015.
"Droits de contrôle versus droits pécuniaires, crise financière et vulnérabilité des banques européennes,"
Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 66(3), pages 527-535.
- Nadia Saghi-Zedek & Amine Tarazi, 2015. "Droits de contrôle versus droits pécuniaires, crise financière et vulnérabilité des banques européennes," Working Papers hal-01134632, HAL.
- Nadia Saghi-Zedek & Amine Tarazi, 2015. "Droits de contrôle versus droits pécuniaires, crise financière et vulnérabilité des banques européennes," Post-Print hal-01135049, HAL.
- Massimo Colombo & Annalisa Croce & Samuele Murtinu, 2014. "Ownership structure, horizontal agency costs and the performance of high-tech entrepreneurial firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 265-282, February.
- Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008.
"Recent developments in German corporate governance,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2004-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2004-014, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM db2cef31-d47e-445d-ba35-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM f1cb70de-0638-4cfc-baf6-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
More about this item
Keywords
ownership; investment performance; corporate governance; institutions; growth;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-SEA-2010-01-30 (South East Asia)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0208. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Vardan Hovsepyan (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cekthse.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.