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Multiplicative output form and its applications to problems in the homogenous innovation contest model

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Listed:
  • Xu Tian

    (Zhejiang University)

  • Gongbing Bi

    (University of Science and Technology of China)

Abstract

Recently, the innovation contests have been an important tool to provide ideas or solutions for companies. In a homogenous innovation contest model, the output form of contestants is usually assumed as a sum of their effort and a random shock. In this paper, we focus on the multiplicative output form in an innovation contest, in which the output form of contestants is a product of their effort and a random shock. We address several contest problems in the model with multiplicative output form, including the award scheme, entry policy, and endogenous duration. We show that the results in the model with additive output form do not always hold in the model with multiplicative output form. Our findings can explain some practical observations and suggest that the model with multiplicative output form can also be a good alternative, which enrich the contest theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu Tian & Gongbing Bi, 2022. "Multiplicative output form and its applications to problems in the homogenous innovation contest model," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 44(3), pages 709-732, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:orspec:v:44:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s00291-022-00667-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s00291-022-00667-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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