Popular Matchings in Complete Graphs
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- Chung-Piaw Teo & Jay Sethuraman, 1998. "The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 23(4), pages 874-891, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
popularmatching; NP-completeness; polynomial algorithm; stable matching;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2020-03-02 (Economic Design)
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