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Games in sequencing situations with externalities

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  • Yang, Guangjing
  • Sun, Hao
  • Hou, Dongshuang
  • Xu, Genjiu

Abstract

In this paper, we consider cooperative games in sequencing situations with externalities, called partition sequencing games, in which the worth of a coalition can be influenced by external players in the queue. We first show that partition sequencing games satisfy cohesiveness and have non-positive externalities. Then by proposing partition rules, which are specifications on how external players should partition themselves, we study the relationships between the allocation given by the Equal Gain Splitting rule (EGS rule) and the cores based on different partition rules. It is shown that the EGS rule always yields a core element no matter which partition rule is applied to the game. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the EGS rule for partition sequencing games.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang, Guangjing & Sun, Hao & Hou, Dongshuang & Xu, Genjiu, 2019. "Games in sequencing situations with externalities," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(2), pages 699-708.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:278:y:2019:i:2:p:699-708
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.04.046
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    2. Andr'e Casajus & Yukihiko Funaki & Frank Huettner, 2024. "Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities," Papers 2402.00394, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    3. Yang, Guangjing & Sun, Hao, 2023. "The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    4. Saavedra–Nieves, Alejandro & Casas–Méndez, Balbina, 2023. "On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 309(3), pages 1365-1378.
    5. Schouten, Jop & Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro & Fiestras-Janeiro, G., 2020. "Sequencing Situations and Games with Non-Linear Cost Functions," Other publications TiSEM 3e1db5c9-0f77-4f91-a075-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. van Beek, Andries & Malmberg, Benjamin & Borm, Peter & Quant, Marieke & Schouten, Jop, 2021. "Cooperation and Competition in Linear Production and Sequencing Processes," Discussion Paper 2021-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Takaaki Abe, 2019. "Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: A partition function approach," Working Papers 1911, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    8. Takaaki Abe, 2021. "Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-16, February.
    9. Kameng Nip & Changjun Wang & Zizhuo Wang, 2022. "Competitive and Cooperative Assortment Games under Markov Chain Choice Model," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(3), pages 1033-1051, March.
    10. Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2020. "On the $$\gamma $$γ-core of asymmetric aggregative games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(4), pages 493-504, May.
    11. Schouten, Jop & Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro & Fiestras-Janeiro, G., 2020. "Sequencing Situations and Games with Non-Linear Cost Functions," Discussion Paper 2020-006, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Schouten, Jop & Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro & Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria, 2021. "Sequencing situations and games with non-linear cost functions under optimal order consistency," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 294(2), pages 734-745.
    13. Sreoshi Banerjee & Parikshit De & Manipushpak Mitra, 2024. "Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(2), pages 323-357, September.

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