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Do financial incentives trump clinical guidance? Hip Replacement in England and Scotland

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  • Papanicolas, Irene
  • McGuire, Alistair

Abstract

Following devolution in 1999 England and Scotland's National Health Services diverged, resulting in major differences in hospital payment. England introduced a case payment mechanism from 2003/4, while Scotland continued to pay through global budgets. We investigate the impact this change had on activity for Hip Replacement. We examine the financial reimbursement attached to uncemented Hip Replacement in England, which has been more generous than for its cemented counterpart, although clinical guidance from the National Institute for Clinical Excellence recommends the later. In Scotland this financial differential does not exist. We use a difference-in-difference estimator, using Scotland as a control, to test whether the change in reimbursement across the two countries had an influence on treatment. Our results indicate that financial incentives are directly linked to the faster uptake of the more expensive, uncemented Hip Replacement in England, which ran against the clinical guidance.

Suggested Citation

  • Papanicolas, Irene & McGuire, Alistair, 2015. "Do financial incentives trump clinical guidance? Hip Replacement in England and Scotland," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 25-36.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:44:y:2015:i:c:p:25-36
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.08.001
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    8. De Luca, Giacomo & Lisi, Domenico & Martorana, Marco & Siciliani, Luigi, 2021. "Does higher Institutional Quality improve the Appropriateness of Healthcare Provision?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    9. Nicholas Benson & Jose Joaquin Lopez, 2024. "Surgeons' response to reimbursement changes for alternative procedures: Evidence from spine fusion in the U.S," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(1), pages 41-55, January.
    10. Surana, Mitul & Dongre, Ambrish, 2018. "Too much care? Private health care sector and surgical interventions during childbirth in India," IIMA Working Papers WP 2018-11-01, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
    11. Michaels, Jonathan A & Maheswaran, Ravi, 2023. "Conflicting perspectives during guidelines development are an important source of implementation failure," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    12. Bhatia, M. & Dwivedi, L.K. & Banerjee, K. & Dixit, P., 2020. "An epidemic of avoidable caesarean deliveries in the private sector in India: Is physician-induced demand at play?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 265(C).
    13. Sofia Amaral-Garcia, 2020. "Medical Device Companies and Doctors: Do their Interactions Affect Medical Treatments ?," Working Papers ECARES 2020-18, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    14. Aleksandr Proshin & Alexandre Cazenave-Lacroutz & Zeynep Or & Lise Rochaix, 2018. "Impact of Diagnosis Related Group Refinement on the Choice Between Scheduled Caesarean Section and Normal Delivery: Recent Evidence from France," Working Papers halshs-01812107, HAL.
    15. Matthias Bäuml, 2021. "How do hospitals respond to cross price incentives inherent in diagnosis‐related groups systems? The importance of substitution in the market for sepsis conditions," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(4), pages 711-728, April.
    16. Rowena Jacobs & Martin Chalkley & María José Aragón & Jan R. Böhnke & Mike Clark & Valerie Moran & Simon Gilbody, 2016. "Funding of mental health services: Do available data support episodic payment?," Working Papers 137cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    17. Milstein, Ricarda & Schreyögg, Jonas, 2024. "The end of an era? Activity-based funding based on diagnosis-related groups: A review of payment reforms in the inpatient sector in 10 high-income countries," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
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    19. Verzulli, R.; & Lippi Bruni, M.;, 2022. "The quicker the better: Fostering timely responses in public hospitals," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 22/08, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.

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