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Incentives to patients versus incentives to health care providers: The users' perspective

Author

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  • Izabela Jelovac

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Philippe Polomé

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In theory, health care providers may adapt their professional behavior to the financial incentives driven by their remuneration. Our research question is whether the users of health care services anticipate such a behavior from their general practitioner (GP) and, if they do, what are the consequences of such an anticipation on their preferences regarding financial incentives. We propose a theoretical model to identify potential determinants of such preferences. We empirically test our theoretical predictions using the data from a survey that elicits individual preferences for either patients' or providers' hypothetical incentives in France. The empirical results confirm the theoretical ones by establishing that users tend to prefer to pay a copayment themselves when the amount of GPs' incentives is high, the one of the patients' copayment is low, they anticipate that their GP's medical decisions are affected by financial incentives and their wealth is high. Otherwise, they prefer their GP to face financial incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Izabela Jelovac & Philippe Polomé, 2015. "Incentives to patients versus incentives to health care providers: The users' perspective," Working Papers halshs-01142578, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01142578
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01142578
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yaping Wu & David Bardey & Yijuan Chen & Sanxi Li, 2021. "Health care insurance policies When the provider and patient may collude," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 525-543, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    incentives; health care providers; patients; individual preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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