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Tax-benefit revealed social preferences

Author

Listed:
  • François Bourguignon

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, The World Bank - The World Bank)

  • Amadéo Spadaro

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UIB - Universitat de les Illes Balears = Universidad de las Islas Baleares = University of the Balearic Islands)

Abstract

This paper inverts the usual logic of applied optimal income taxation. It starts from the observed distribution of income before and after redistribution and corresponding marginal tax rates. Under a set of simplifying assumptions, it is then possible to recover the social welfare function that would make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. In this framework, the issue of the optimality of an existing tax-benefit system is transformed into the issue of the shape of the social welfare function associated with that system and whether it satisfies elementary properties. This method is applied to the French redistribution system with the interesting implication that the French redistribution authority either has a rather low estimate of the labor supply elasticity or does not give positive social weights to the richest tax payers.

Suggested Citation

  • François Bourguignon & Amadéo Spadaro, 2005. "Tax-benefit revealed social preferences," Working Papers halshs-00590779, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590779
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00590779
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social welfare function; optimal income tax; microsimulation; optimal inverse problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques

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