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Évolution des attentes sociales et comportement électoral : France, 1978-2002

Author

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  • Elvire Guillaud

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2)

  • Stefano Palombarini

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis)

Abstract

This paper empirically identifies the multi-dimensionality and the evolution of the political demand of heterogeneous agents. For that purpose, we analyze French post-electoral surveys over the period 1978-2002. The analysis highlights the roots of the French political crisis, which occurred in 2002 while a Far Right candidate reached the second round of the Presidential elections. The key point is the gathering of socio-economic groups around the economic themes that design the political space. Since these themes are evolving over time, social alliances are moving, too. The economic crisis during the 80s and the European integration process of the 90s determine the political demands and multiply the break lines: the two social blocks that used to support the Republican Right and the governmental Left progressively break up.

Suggested Citation

  • Elvire Guillaud & Stefano Palombarini, 2006. "Évolution des attentes sociales et comportement électoral : France, 1978-2002," Working Papers halshs-00590295, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590295
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00590295
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John E. Roemer & Karine Van der Straeten, 2006. "The Political Economy of Xenophobia and Distribution: The Case of Denmark," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 251-277, July.
    2. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, October.
    3. John Roemer & Karine Straeten, 2005. "Xenophobia and the Size of the Public Sector in France: A Politico-economic Analysis," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 86(2), pages 95-144, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kristel Jacquier, 2012. "Public Support for European Integration: A comparative analysis," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12088, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    2. Bruno Amable, 2007. "La fin du modèle européen ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 117(4), pages 551-575.
    3. Kristel Jacquier, 2012. "Public Support for European Integration : A comparative analysis," Post-Print halshs-00768907, HAL.
    4. Bruno Amable & Elvire Guillaud & Stefano Palombarini, 2011. "The political economy of neo-liberalism in Italy and France," Post-Print halshs-00639450, HAL.
    5. Kristel Jacquier, 2012. "Public Support for European Integration : A comparative analysis," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00768907, HAL.

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