A Markovian decision model of adaptive cancer treatment and quality of life
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- Brown, Joel & Dubbeldam, Johan & Broom, Mark & Bayer, Péter, 2022. "A Markovian decision model of adaptive cancer treatment and quality of life," TSE Working Papers 22-1291, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Peter Bayer & Joel S. Brown & Johan Dubbeldam & Mark Broom, 2022. "A Markovian decision model of adaptive cancer treatment and quality of life," Post-Print hal-03767027, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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