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Common-Pool Resources are Intrinsically Unstable

Author

Listed:
  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    (Research Center for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology)

  • Jun Feng

    (Research Center for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology)

  • Yutaka Kobayashi

    (Research Center for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology)

Abstract

Efficient allocations in common-pool resources cannot be accomplished when appropriators are selfish. In addition, we find that a system of a common-pool resource is locally unstable if there are four or more appropriators. Such instability most likely makes efficiency worse than that in the Nash equilibrium. These results indicate that equilibrium analyses might not capture the essence of the common-pool resource problem. They may also provide an answer to the unexplained pulsing behavior among appropriators and inefficiency observed in experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Jun Feng & Yutaka Kobayashi, 2017. "Common-Pool Resources are Intrinsically Unstable," Working Papers SDES-2017-5, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised May 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2017-5
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    File URL: http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2017-5.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2017
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Koffi Serge William Yao, 2021. "An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option," Post-Print hal-03418905, HAL.
    2. Gao, Liyan & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2024. "Impact of dynamic compensation with resource feedback on the common pool resource game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    3. Koffi Serge William Yao, 2021. "An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-14, October.
    4. Koffi Serge William Yao & Emmanuelle Lavaine & Marc Willinger, 2021. "Effectiveness of the approval mechanism for CPR dilemmas: unanimity versus majority rule," CEE-M Working Papers hal-03234786, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
    5. De Geest, Lawrence R. & Stranlund, John K., 2019. "Defending public goods and common-pool resources," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 143-154.
    6. Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2020. "Global Stability of Voluntary Contribution Mechanism with Heterogeneous Preferences," Working Papers SDES-2020-6, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jul 2020.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    instability; Nash equilibrium; common-pool resources; pulsing behavior; appropriation problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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