Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements
[Elections ordinaires et aménagements constitutionnels]
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- SALMON, Pierre, 1999. "Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangement," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1999-10, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
References listed on IDEAS
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1993-02, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
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- Giovanni Sartori, 1994. "Comparative Constitutional Engineering," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-22861-4, June.
- Albert Breton & Galeotti Gianluigi & Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe, 1991. "The Competitive State," Post-Print hal-00445590, HAL.
- Peter Ordeshook, 1992. "Constitutional stability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-175, March.
Citations
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Cited by:
- BRETON, Albert & SALMON, Pierre, 2002.
"Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism,"
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2002-06, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
- Albert Breton & Pierre Salmon, 2003. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics: their effects on secessionism," Post-Print hal-00445598, HAL.
- Pierre Salmon, 2001.
"Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions,"
Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 333-349, December.
- Pierre Salmon, 2001. "Constitutional Implications of electoral assumptions," Post-Print hal-00445605, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
General Studies. Ideologies.; Political sociology of International Relations; Sociology daily life; Voter; Sociologie; Constitution; Electeur; Election; Etudes générales. Idéologies.; Sociologie politique;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
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