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How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper

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  • Pierre Salmon

    (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The significance of yardstick competition among governments is now confirmed with regard to fiscal variables. This is an important result but the significance of the mechanism must also be sought in a context broader than that of fiscal federalism and without limitation to relations and processes fully observable. Three points are made. Even in the case of governments trying to mimic each other over a single variable, additional variables are involved in an important way. Yardstick competition can be latent without being ineffective. Its major effect, then, is to set bounds to the choices that office-holders could think of making. Finally, the mechanism is a hidden albeit essential component of the political and economic system, which would look quite different if voters could not make comparisons across jurisdictions and there were thus no yardstick competition, even of the latent variety.

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  • Pierre Salmon, 2013. "How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper," Working Papers hal-00830872, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00830872
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00830872
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    Cited by:

    1. Hory, Marie-Pierre, 2018. "Delayed mimicking: the timing of fiscal interactions in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 97-118.
    2. Laurent Van Malderen & Marcel Gerard, 2013. "Testing yardstick competition through a vote-function: evidence from the Walloon municipalities," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 2(4), pages 206-214.

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    Keywords

    political yardstick competition; federalism; decentralization; systems;
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