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Property rights with biological spillovers : when Hardin meets Meade

Author

Listed:
  • Carlotta Balestra

    (CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain)

  • Thierry Bréchet

    (CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain)

  • Stéphane Lambrecht

    (EQUIPPE - Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales - PRES Université Lille Nord de France - Université de Lille, Droit et Santé)

Abstract

In an overlapping generations (OLG) setup we address the issue of the optimal number of property rights to allocate over a natural resource when the goal is to maximize the stock of the natural resource at the steady state. We assume that the e ect of the enforced property rights regime on the evolution of the resource is twofold: through biological spillovers and through monitoring costs. Property rights are assigned to local communities, which can decide whether to cooperate or not. The outcome in the strategic setting is hence compared to the one in the cooperative setup. A scal policy able to decentralize the cooperative outcome is studied.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlotta Balestra & Thierry Bréchet & Stéphane Lambrecht, 2012. "Property rights with biological spillovers : when Hardin meets Meade," Working Papers hal-00989828, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00989828
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-lille.fr/hal-00989828
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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