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La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun

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  • Philippe Mongin

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Taking the philosophical standpoint, this article compares the mathematical theory of individual decision-making with the folk psychology conception of action, desire and belief. It narrows down its topic by carrying the comparison vis-à-vis Savage's system and its technical concept of subjective probability, which is referred to the basic model of betting as in Ramsey. The argument is organized around three philosophical theses: (i) decision theory is nothing but folk psychology stated in formal language (Lewis), (ii) the former substantially improves on the latter, but is unable to overcome its typical limitations, especially its failure to separate desire and belief empirically (Davidson), (iii) the former substantially improves on the latter, and through these innovations, overcomes some of the limitations. The aim of the article is to establish (iii) not only against the all too simple thesis (i), but also against the subtle thesis (ii).

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Mongin, 2011. "La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun," Working Papers hal-00625445, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00625445
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cohen, M. & Tallon, J.M., 1999. "Decision dans le risque et l'incertitude:l'apport des modeles non additifs," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 1999.69, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    2. Philippe Mongin, 2003. "L'axiomatisation et les théories économiques," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 54(1), pages 99-138.
    3. Karni, Edi, 1996. "Probabilities and Beliefs," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 249-262, November.
    4. Edi Karni & Philippe Mongin, 2000. "On the Determination of Subjective Probability by Choices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 233-248, February.
    5. Rosenberg, Alexander, 1992. "Economics--Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns?," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226727233, October.
    6. Richard Bradley, 2007. "A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 233-263, November.
    7. Gilboa,Itzhak, 2009. "Theory of Decision under Uncertainty," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521517324, November.
    8. Philippe Mongin, 2002. "Le principe de rationalité et l'unité des sciences sociales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(2), pages 301-323.
    9. Guala,Francesco, 2005. "The Methodology of Experimental Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521618618, November.
    10. Machina, Mark J & Schmeidler, David, 1992. "A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 745-780, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2016. "Mentalism Versus Behaviourism In Economics: A Philosophy-Of-Science Perspective," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 249-281, July.
    2. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-01249632 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Michaël Lainé, 2014. "Vers une alternative au paradigme de la rationalité ? Victoires et déboires du programme spinoziste en économie," Post-Print hal-01335618, HAL.
    4. Gilbert Giacomoni, 2012. "On the Origin of Abstraction : Real and Imaginary Parts of Decidability-Making," Post-Print hal-00750628, HAL.
    5. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01249632 is not listed on IDEAS

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