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Does the fight against corruption require international cooperation?

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  • Pierre-Henri Faure

    (Larefi - Laboratoire d'analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales - UB - Université de Bordeaux)

Abstract

This paper explores the role of corruption in a two-country model with fiscal spillovers. In the absence of cooperation on governance issues, countries always have a strategic incentive to appoint policymakers whose aversion to corruption is lower than average. An international agreement is a precondition for placing corruption fighters at the head of governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Henri Faure, 2011. "Does the fight against corruption require international cooperation?," Working Papers hal-00610523, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00610523
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00610523
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carsten Hefeker, 2010. "Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 338-346, March.
    2. Huang, Haizhou & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2006. "Monetary policies for developing countries: The role of institutional quality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 239-252, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Fiscal policy; International cooperation;
    All these keywords.

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