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The Effects of Corruption in a Monetary Union

Author

Listed:
  • Montserrat Ferre

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

  • Judit Garcia

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

  • Carolina Manzano

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

Abstract

72% of Europeans in European Monetary Union countries think that corruption is widespread in their country. Corruption can affect the individual country’s performance and, in turn, impact on the performance of the other members of the monetary union. In this article, we will present a monetary union composed of two countries and we will study how the presence of corruption in one member country will affect its economy and the neighbour’s economy. Additionally, we will analyse what measures could reduce the negative spillover effects generated by the presence of corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Montserrat Ferre & Judit Garcia & Carolina Manzano, 2021. "The Effects of Corruption in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 539-557, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:32:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11079-020-09608-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11079-020-09608-0
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Fiscal policy; Monetary policy; Monetary union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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