Empirical Approach Upon The Relationship Between Central Bank Independence And Inflation In Developed And Developing Countries
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More about this item
Keywords
inflation targeting; central bank transparency; communication strategy; decision-making process; inflation level;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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