IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00610540.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A note on poor-institution traps in international fiscal policy game

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-Henri Faure

    (Larefi - Laboratoire d'analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales - UB - Université de Bordeaux)

Abstract

This note explores the link between the effort level to strengthen institutional quality and the nature of the fiscal policy game among interdependent economies plagued by corruption. Every country has a lower incentive to improve public governance when the effort made abroad to remedy institutional deficiencies becomes weaker. More importantly, the model highlights a possible trade-off between fighting corruption in interrelated developing countries and promoting fiscal policy coordination among them: cooperation goes together with the acceptance of more corruption. It follows that poor-institution traps can be Pareto-improving.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Henri Faure, 2011. "A note on poor-institution traps in international fiscal policy game," Post-Print hal-00610540, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00610540
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00610540v2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-00610540v2/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carsten Hefeker, 2010. "Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 338-346, March.
    2. Aidt, Toke & Dutta, Jayasri & Sena, Vania, 2008. "Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-220, June.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-630, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Garcia Fortuny, Judit, 2014. "The Effects of Corruption and Seigniorage on Growth and Inflation," Working Papers 2072/246961, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    2. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2015. "Fiscal Policy, Institutional Quality and Central Bank Transparency," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(5), pages 523-545, September.
    3. Montserrat Ferre & Judit Garcia & Carolina Manzano, 2021. "The Effects of Corruption in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 539-557, July.
    4. Katherina Popkova, 2011. "Can the exchange rate regime influence corruption?," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 148-11, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    5. Bohn Frank, 2013. "The Politics of Surprise Devaluations: Modelling Motives for Giving Up a Peg," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 233(5-6), pages 562-574, October.
    6. Ferré, Montserrat & Garcia, Judit & Manzano, Carolina, 2018. "Tax efficiency, seigniorage and Central Bank Conservativeness," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 218-230.
    7. Dimakou, Ourania, 2013. "Monetary and fiscal institutional designs," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 1141-1166.
    8. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.
    9. Anton Muscatelli & Patrizio Tirelli & Carmine Trecroci, 2001. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions over the Cycle: Some Empirical Evidence," Working Papers 2002_13, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Oct 2002.
    10. Ms. Francesca Castellani & Mr. Xavier Debrun, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 2001/205, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Martin, Fernando M., 2015. "Debt, inflation and central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 129-150.
    12. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2000. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 247-269, March.
    13. L. Lambertini & R. Rovelli, 2003. "Monetary and fiscal policy coordination and macroeconomic stabilization. A theoretical analysis," Working Papers 464, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    14. Chandan Sharma, 2021. "Does Corruption Sand The Wheels Of Financial Sector Development? Evidence From Global Panel Data," Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions (JFMMI), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 1-32, December.
    15. Ghulam Shabbir & Mumtaz Anwar & Shahid Adil, 2016. "Corruption, Political Stability and Economic Growth," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 689-702.
    16. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Debt targets and fiscal sustainability in an era of monetary independence," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 165-187, July.
    17. Muscatelli, Vito A. & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2012. "A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 14-26.
    18. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2082 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 2003. "Strategic debt accumulation in a heterogeneous monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-15, March.
    20. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
    21. Harouna Sedgo & Luc Désiré Omgba, 2023. "Corruption and distortion of public expenditures: evidence from Africa," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(2), pages 419-452, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00610540. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.