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The régulation of transborder network services

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  • Per Agrell

    (CORE)

  • Jérôme Pouyet

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Integration and reinforcement of network infrastructure for transport, energy and water is a key component in the European policy framework for market competitiveness. However, in spite of considerable analysis and community co-funding since 1995, actual implementation progress for the 90 priority projects in the Transeuropean Energy Networks programme has been meager.The estimated network investment need of 40,000 M euro (2003-2013) is challenging the current heterogenous institutional mix of European network operators, regulators and the role of the commission. This paper presents an analytic framework for the network investment problem under decentralized control in both regulation, infrastructure ownership and management. Our results on the underinvestment problem from regulatory competition and non-coordination provide insights into the policy relevant topic of common infrastructure investment under varying budget balancing constraints and management objectives. From an economic policy viewpoint, the paper is tangential to the more general discussion on regulatory centralization vs. subsidiarity in the European Union.

Suggested Citation

  • Per Agrell & Jérôme Pouyet, 2005. "The régulation of transborder network services," Working Papers hal-00243022, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243022
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bassanini, Anna & Pouyet, Jerome, 2005. "Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 233-259, February.
    2. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    4. Ken Hendricks & Michele Piccione & Guofu Tan, 1997. "Entry and Exit in Hub-Spoke Networks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 291-303, Summer.
    5. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-122, February.
    6. Ming Chang, 1996. "Ramsey pricing in a hierarchical structure with an application to network-access pricing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 281-314, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friebel, Guido & Ivaldi, Marc & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2011. "Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation," IDEI Working Papers 680, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 07 Jun 2012.
    2. Friebel, Guido & Ivaldi, Marc & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2011. "Separation versus Integration in International Rail Markets: A Theoretical Investigation," TSE Working Papers 11-248, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2013.

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