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De la Grande Guerre à la National Recovery Administration (1917-1935) : Les arguments en faveur d'une concurrence régulée dans les États-Unis de l'entre-deux-guerres

Author

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  • Thierry Kirat

    (IRISSO - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Sciences Sociales - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Frédéric Marty

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

L'expérience de l'économie de guerre a renforcé aux États-Unis l'influence d'arguments en faveur d'une concurrence organisée. Étendant les prescriptions du management scientifique des firmes à l'ensemble de l'économie, cette approche visait leur coordination par des échanges d'informations. Cette dernière était vue à la fois comme une nécessité en termes d'efficacité économique et de réponse aux fluctuations cycliques. Une telle perspective conduisait à réduire drastiquement la portée des règles de concurrence.Cependant, des propositions faites lors de la crise de 1929 conduisirent à reproduire en temps de paix l'expérience de l'économie de guerre au risque de mener l'économie américaine à une cartellisation sous l'égide de l'État fédéral.Elles furent rejetées par le Président Hoover pourtant défenseur dans les années1920 d'un modèle de concurrence régulée. Ces projets furent paradoxalement repris par le Président Roosevelt dans le cadre du premier New Deal. Cet article traite des arguments qui furent avancés pour s'abstraire des règles de concurrence et explique pourquoi l'administration démocrate décida finalement de revenir à une activation résolue du Sherman Act

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2021. "De la Grande Guerre à la National Recovery Administration (1917-1935) : Les arguments en faveur d'une concurrence régulée dans les États-Unis de l'entre-deux-guerres," Post-Print halshs-03159163, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03159163
    DOI: 10.3917/reof.171.0239
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03159163
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-Luc Gaffard & Michel Quéré, 2007. "What’s the aim for competition policy: Optimizing market structure or encouraging innovative behaviors?," Springer Books, in: Uwe Cantner & Franco Malerba (ed.), Innovation, Industrial Dynamics and Structural Transformation, pages 393-405, Springer.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    économie de guerre; cartellisation; règles de concurrence; management scientifique; échanges d'information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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