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Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game

Author

Listed:
  • David Danz

    (TUB - Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin, WZB - Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung - FVB - Forschungsverbund Berlin e.V. (FVB))

  • Steffen Huck

    (UCL - University College of London [London], WZB - Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung - FVB - Forschungsverbund Berlin e.V. (FVB))

  • Philippe Jehiel

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they make use of this information even if it is less precise than their own private statistics – except for very high stakes. Making public information more precise has two consequences: It is also used when the stakes are very high and it reduces the number of subjects who ignore any information – public and private. That is, precise public information crowds in the use of own information. Finally, our results shed some light on unraveling in centipede games.

Suggested Citation

  • David Danz & Steffen Huck & Philippe Jehiel, 2016. "Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game," Post-Print halshs-01497368, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01497368
    DOI: 10.1111/geer.12098
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2004. "Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 435-446, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore & Kovářík, Jaromír, 2020. "Non-equilibrium play in centipede games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 391-433.
    2. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
    3. Huck, Steffen & Lünser, Gabriele K. & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2012. "Competition fosters trust," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 195-209.
    4. Luay M. Assidmi & Erin Wolgamuth, 2017. "Uncovering the Dynamics of the Saudi Youth Unemployment Crisis," Systemic Practice and Action Research, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 173-186, April.
    5. Claudia Keser & Alexia Gaudeul, 2016. "Foreword: Special Issue in Honor of Reinhard Selten's 85th Birthday," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 277-283, August.
    6. Astrid Gamba & Tobias Regner, 2015. "Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    7. Gamba, Astrid & Regner, Tobias, 2019. "Preferences-dependent learning in the centipede game: The persistence of mistrust," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public information;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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