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Can active labor market policy be counter-productive?

Author

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  • Gilles Saint-Paul

    (New York University [Abu Dhabi] - NYU - NYU System, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We study active labor market policies (ALMP) in a matching model with heterogenous workers. ALMPs are modeled as a subsidy to job search, and search takes place along an extensive margin. An additional job seeker affects the quality of unemployed workers. As a result, the Hosios conditions for efficiency are no longer valid: to replicate the optimum the worker share in bargaining must exceed the Hosios level, and one must impose a tax on job search activity. We also characterize the coalition in favor of ALMP.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Saint-Paul, 2015. "Can active labor market policy be counter-productive?," Post-Print halshs-01314291, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01314291
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2014.11.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mortensen, Dale & Pissarides, Christopher, 2011. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
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    7. Etienne Lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2007. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 867-884, October.
    8. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2000. "The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198293323.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and macroeconomics," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 373-383.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Active labor market policies; Job matching; Hosios condition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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