IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v110y2000i460p92-112.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pareto-Improving Immigration in an Economy with Equilibrium Unemployment

Author

Listed:
  • Ortega, Javier

Abstract

A dynamic two-country labour matching economy is presented. Workers decide whether to search in their native country or look for a job abroad (bearing an additional cost). The number of vacancies posted by firms in each country depends on the average characteristics of the workers searching inside that country. Wages are determined in an individual Nash bargain. We show the existence of multiple steady-state equilibria: one no-migration equilibrium and two migration equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria is due to a self-fulfilling prophecy phenomenon linking average wages and incentives to migrate. The equilibria are Pareto-ranked, with migration-equilibria dominating no-migration.

Suggested Citation

  • Ortega, Javier, 2000. "Pareto-Improving Immigration in an Economy with Equilibrium Unemployment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 92-112, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:110:y:2000:i:460:p:92-112
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:110:y:2000:i:460:p:92-112. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing or Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.