IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00941138.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Destructive Behavior in a Fragile Public Good Game

Author

Listed:
  • Maximilian Hoyer

    (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam, Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam - UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Nadège Bault

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Ben Loerakker

    (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam, Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam - UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Frans van Winden

    (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam, Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam - UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Abstract

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment - like damaging public goods - is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%. Female subjects are found to be more inclined to use destructive decisions. Finally, subjects’ social value orientation turns out to be partly predictive of (at least initial) destructive choices.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Maximilian Hoyer & Nadège Bault & Ben Loerakker & Frans van Winden, 2013. "Destructive Behavior in a Fragile Public Good Game," Post-Print halshs-00941138, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00941138
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Andreoni, 1995. "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 1-21.
    2. Stefano DellaVigna & John A. List & Ulrike Malmendier & Gautam Rao, 2013. "The Importance of Being Marginal: Gender Differences in Generosity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 586-590, May.
    3. Goerg, Sebastian J. & Walkowitz, Gari, 2010. "On the prevalence of framing effects across subject-pools in a two-person cooperation game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 849-859, December.
    4. Abbink, Klaus & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2009. "The pleasure of being nasty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 306-308, December.
    5. R. Cookson, 2000. "Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(1), pages 55-79, June.
    6. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2008. "Spiteful Behavior in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 85, pages 802-816, Elsevier.
    7. Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur & Offerman, Theo, 1998. "Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 143-161, January.
    8. Fujimoto, Hiroaki & Park, Eun-Soo, 2010. "Framing effects and gender differences in voluntary public goods provision experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 455-457, August.
    9. Willinger, Marc & Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, 1999. "Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 323-328, December.
    10. Laury, Susan K. & Holt, Charles A., 2008. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Results with Interior Nash Equilibria," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 84, pages 792-801, Elsevier.
    11. van Dijk, Frans & Sonnemans, Joep & van Winden, Frans, 2002. "Social ties in a public good experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 275-299, August.
    12. Ananish Chaudhuri, 2011. "Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(1), pages 47-83, March.
    13. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Engelmann, Dirk, 2011. "Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 319-332, May.
    14. Menusch Khadjavi & Andreas Lange, 2015. "Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 432-441, September.
    15. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Noussair, Charles N. & Wilkening, Tom, 2012. "Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 797-807.
    16. Zizzo, Daniel John, 2003. "Money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 263-266, November.
    17. Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, 2009. "Gender Differences in Preferences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 448-474, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sanjaya, Muhammad Ryan, 2023. "Antisocial behavior in experiments: What have we learned from the past two decades?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 104-115.
    2. Müller, Julia & Schwieren, Christiane & Spitzer, Florian, 2016. "What Drives Destruction? On the Malleability of Anti-Social Behavior," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 238, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    3. Blanco, Esther & Haller, Tobias & Lopez, Maria Claudia & Walker, James M., 2016. "The tension between private benefits and degradation externalities from appropriation in the commons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 136-147.
    4. Esther Blanco & Tobias Haller & James M. Walker, 2017. "Externalities in appropriation: responses to probabilistic losses," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(4), pages 793-808, December.
    5. van Winden, Frans, 2015. "Political economy with affect: On the role of emotions and relationships in political economics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 298-311.
    6. Müller, Julia & Schwieren, Christiane & Spitzer, Florian, 2022. "How to prevent destruction – On the malleability of anti-social behavior," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    7. Loerakker, Ben & Bault, Nadège & Hoyer, Maximilian & van Winden, Frans, 2022. "On the Development of Cooperative and Antagonistic Relationships in Public Good Environments. A Model-Based Experimental Study," OSF Preprints wur7c, Center for Open Science.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gächter, Simon & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, 2011. "The framing of games and the psychology of play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 459-478.
    2. Feng, Jun & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Shen, Junyi & Qin, Xiangdong, 2018. "Instability in the voluntary contribution mechanism with a quasi-linear payoff function: An experimental analysis," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 67-77.
    3. Sebastian J. Goerg & David Rand & Gari Walkowitz, 2020. "Framing effects in the prisoner’s dilemma but not in the dictator game," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 1-12, June.
    4. Ramalingam, Abhijit & Morales, Antonio J. & Walker, James M., 2019. "Peer punishment of acts of omission versus acts of commission in give and take social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 133-147.
    5. Kölle, Felix & Gächter, Simon & Quercia, Simone, 2014. "The ABC of Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution and Common Pool Extraction Games," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100417, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Müller, Julia & Schwieren, Christiane & Spitzer, Florian, 2022. "How to prevent destruction – On the malleability of anti-social behavior," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    7. Müller, Julia & Schwieren, Christiane & Spitzer, Florian, 2016. "What Drives Destruction? On the Malleability of Anti-Social Behavior," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 238, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    8. Abhijit Ramalingam & Antonio J. Morales & James M. Walker, 2018. "Peer Punishment in Repeated Isomorphic Give and Take Social Dilemmas," Working Papers 18-15, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    9. Brekke, Kjell Arne & Konow, James & Nyborg, Karine, 2017. "Framing in a threshold public goods experiment with heterogeneous endowments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 99-110.
    10. Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 2017. "The role of frames, numbers and risk in the frequency of cooperation," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(3), pages 245-267, September.
    11. Edward Cartwright, 2016. "A comment on framing effects in linear public good games," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(1), pages 73-84, May.
    12. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Cooperation: The Power Of A Single Word? Some Experimental Evidence On Wording And Gender Effects In A Game Of Chicken," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 43-64, January.
    13. Martin Dufwenberg & Simon Gaechter & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Strategic Choice," Discussion Papers 2006-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    14. James C. Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj & Susan Xu Tang, 2023. "Morally monotonic choice in public good games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(3), pages 697-725, July.
    15. Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad & Brekke, Kjell Arne & Richter, Andries, 2019. "Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 45-56.
    16. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gächter, Simon & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, 2011. "The framing of games and the psychology of play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 459-478.
    17. Gächter, Simon & Kölle, Felix & Quercia, Simone, 2022. "Preferences and perceptions in Provision and Maintenance public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 338-355.
    18. Sun-Ki Chai & Dolgorsuren Dorj & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2018. "Cultural Values and Behavior in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games: An Experimental Study," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experimental Economics and Culture, volume 20, pages 89-166, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    19. Khadjavi, Menusch & Lange, Andreas & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2014. "The Social Value of Transparency and Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Asymmetric Public Good Games," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100512, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Chan, Nathan W. & Wolk, Leonard, 2020. "Cost-effective giving with multiple public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 130-145.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public good; destructive behavior; spite; relationship; laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00941138. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.