Nonmanipulable Cores
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- Demange, Gabrielle, 1987. "Nonmanipulable Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1057-1074, September.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Ehlers, Lars, 2018.
"Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 393-407.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited," Cahiers de recherche 2014-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Lars EHLERS, 2014. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited," Cahiers de recherche 05-2014, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2007.
"Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 537-547, May.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2005. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems," Cahiers de recherche 2005-11, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2005. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems," Cahiers de recherche 12-2005, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Stefano Vannucci, 2004. "A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires," Department of Economics University of Siena 437, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Demange, Gabrielle, 2009.
"The strategy structure of some coalition formation games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 83-104, January.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2006. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," Working Papers halshs-00590290, HAL.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2006. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590290, HAL.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2009. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," Post-Print halshs-00670881, HAL.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2009. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00670881, HAL.
- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2006.
"Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 545-570, December.
- Carmelo Rodr?uez-?varez, 2001. "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 492.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo, 2003. "Candidate Stability And Voting Correspondences," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 666, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo, 2003. "Candidate Stability and Voting Corespondences," Economic Research Papers 269479, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2021.
"Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 105-118, March.
- Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 26081, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2015.
"Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences,"
MPRA Paper
75469, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2016.
- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," Working Papers halshs-01226803, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," Working Papers 1528, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Jagadeesan, Ravi & Kominers, Scott Duke & Rheingans-Yoo, Ross, 2018. "Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 287-294.
- Csóka, Péter & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Kóczy, László Á. & Pintér, Miklós, 2011.
"Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 209(1), pages 57-62, February.
- Csóka, P. & Herings, P.J.J. & Kóczy, L.Á. & Pintér, M., 2009. "Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy & Miklós Pintér, 2009. "Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility," Working Paper Series 0904, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- Ravi Jagadeesan & Scott Duke Kominers & Ross Rheingans-Yoo, 2020. "Lone wolves in competitive equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 215-228, August.
- Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2014. "Moral hazard and stability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 659-682, October.
- Klaus Nehring & Massimiliano Marcellino, 2003. "Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness For Correspondences," Working Papers 193, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Masashi Umezawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 151-158, June.
- Jinpeng Ma, 1998.
"Strategic Formation of Coalitions,"
Discussion Papers
1225, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jinpeng Ma, 1998. "Strategic Formation of Coalitions," Departmental Working Papers 199810, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1996. "Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games," UC3M Working papers. Economics 3965, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1997. "Core Equivalence Theorems for Infinite Convex Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-12, September.
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Keywords
Nonmanipulable correspondance; core; effectivity function;All these keywords.
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