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Time Preferences and Job Search: Evidence from France

Author

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  • Bassem Ben Halima

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Mohamed Ben Halima

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Increasing impatience reduces search efforts of unemployed job seekers and therefore decreases the exit rate from unemployment. Also, impatience reduces reservation wage and increases the exit rate. To determine the overall effect of impatience on the exit rate from unemployment, we distinguish between exponential and hyperbolic time preferences. Search effort dominates the reservation wage and decreases the exit rate from unemployment if individuals have hyperbolic, rather than exponential, preferences. Using the French sample of the European Household Panel Survey, we found that search effort has a strong effect on the duration of unemployment, whereas the reservation wage is not significant. This result shows that the job seekers have hyperbolic preferences. Hyperbolic preferences affect problems associated with job search and policies aimed at reducing unemployment.

Suggested Citation

  • Bassem Ben Halima & Mohamed Ben Halima, 2009. "Time Preferences and Job Search: Evidence from France," Post-Print halshs-00451621, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00451621
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00451621
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    3. T.M. van Huizen & J. Plantenga, 2013. "Job Search Behaviour and Time Preferences: Evidence from the Netherlands," Working Papers 13-03, Utrecht School of Economics.
    4. Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 811-846.
      • Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000. "Measuring Trust," Scholarly Articles 4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Manuel A. Utset, 2023. "Time-Inconsistent Bargaining and Cross-Commitments," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-21, April.
    6. Jonathan Cohen & Keith Marzilli Ericson & David Laibson & John Myles White, 2020. "Measuring Time Preferences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(2), pages 299-347, June.
    7. Dawoon Jung & Tushar Bharati & Seungwoo Chin, 2021. "Does Education Affect Time Preference? Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(4), pages 1451-1499.

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