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The perils of a coherent narrative

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Ispano

    (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, IUF - Institut universitaire de France - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche, LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

A persuader influences a decision maker by providing a narrative for interpreting upcoming news. The decision maker adopts the narrative if it does not distort the marginal distribution of news. Both parties can benefit if the persuader can provide news-contingent (overall incoherent) narratives, privately learn the truth, or design the process of news arrival.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Ispano, 2025. "The perils of a coherent narrative," Post-Print hal-04982905, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04982905
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01640-w
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    2. Ran Spiegler, 2016. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(3), pages 1243-1290.
    3. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2020. "A Model of Competing Narratives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(12), pages 3786-3816, December.
    4. Simone Galperti, 2019. "Persuasion: The Art of Changing Worldviews," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 996-1031, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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