IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v134y2021ics0014292121000659.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs

Author

Listed:
  • Eliaz, Kfir
  • Spiegler, Ran
  • Thysen, Heidi C.

Abstract

We study a two-action, two-state pure persuasion game in which the receiver has non-rational expectations. The sender can add ambiguity to his message by pooling it with other messages. This can be likened to selective redaction of the original message. The receiver knows the sender’s message strategy but not his redaction strategy, and uses only the former to draw inferences from the redacted message. We characterize the highest probability of persuasion attainable by the sender under these conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021. "Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:134:y:2021:i:c:s0014292121000659
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103712
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292121000659
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103712?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite & Kotaro Suzumura, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47.
    2. Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
    3. ,, 2011. "Manipulative auction design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
    4. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    5. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2014. "Complex Questionnaires," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1529-1541, July.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    7. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2012. "A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(6), pages 1057-1082.
    8. Joshua Schwartzstein & Adi Sunderam, 2021. "Using Models to Persuade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(1), pages 276-323, January.
    9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    10. Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Coarse Thinking and Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 577-619.
    11. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2020. "Cheap talk with coarse understanding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 105-121.
    12. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    13. Simone Galperti, 2019. "Persuasion: The Art of Changing Worldviews," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 996-1031, March.
    14. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021. "Strategic interpretations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    15. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein Rubinstein, 2019. "Coordinating with a “Problem Solver”," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 2813-2819, June.
    16. John Geanakoplos, 1989. "Game Theory Without Partitions, and Applications to Speculation and Consensus," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 914, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Victor Augias & Daniel M A Barreto, 2022. "Persuading a Wishful Thinker," Working Papers hal-04066849, HAL.
    2. Victor Augias & Daniel M A Barreto, 2022. "Persuading a Wishful Thinker," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-04066849, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021. "Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 109842, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Coarse Thinking and Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 577-619.
    3. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2020. "Cheap talk with coarse understanding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 105-121.
    4. Ran Spiegler, 2023. "Behavioral Causal Inference," Papers 2305.18916, arXiv.org.
    5. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
    6. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," Working Papers hal-03393108, HAL.
    7. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Antler, Yair, 2018. "Multilevel Marketing: Pyramid-Shaped Schemes or Exploitative Scams?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Panos Markopoulos & Kartik Hosanagar, 2013. "A Model of Product Design and Information Disclosure Investments," Working Papers 13-25, NET Institute.
    11. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021. "Strategic interpretations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    13. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2012. "An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2220-2259.
    14. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Rational attitude change by reference cues when information elaboration requires effort," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 90-107.
    15. Li, Sanxi & Peitz, Martin & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2016. "Information disclosure and consumer awareness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 209-230.
    16. Conlin, Michael & Dickert-Conlin, Stacy, 2017. "Inference by college admission departments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 14-28.
    17. , & Frechette, Guilaume & Perego, Jacopo, 2019. "Rules and Commitment in Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 14085, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2017. "Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 54-75, May.
    20. Panos M. Markopoulos & Kartik Hosanagar, 2018. "A Model of Product Design and Information Disclosure Investments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 739-759, February.
    21. Haisken-DeNew, John & Hasan, Syed & Jha, Nikhil & Sinning, Mathias, 2018. "Unawareness and selective disclosure: The effect of school quality information on property prices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 449-464.
    22. Matthew Plosser & João A. C. Santos, 2014. "Banks' incentives and the quality of internal risk models," Staff Reports 704, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    23. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2017. "Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2041-2065, September.
    24. Marco LiCalzi & Roland Mühlenbernd, 2022. "Feature-weighted categorized play across symmetric games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 1052-1078, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:134:y:2021:i:c:s0014292121000659. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.