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Invariance of equilibrium to the strategy method I: theory

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel L. Chen

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Martin Schonger

    (ETH Zürich - Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich])

Abstract

This article highlights a potential and significant economic–theoretical bias in the widely used strategy method (SM) technique. Although SM is commonly employed to analyze numerous observations per subject regarding rare or off-equilibrium behaviors unattainable through direct elicitation (DE), researchers often overlook a critical distinction. The strategic equivalence between SM and DE is applicable in the context of monetary payoff games, but not in the actual utility-based games played by participants. This oversight may lead to inaccurate conclusions and demand a reevaluation of existing research in the field. We formalize the mapping from the monetary payoff game to this actual game and delineate necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic equivalence to apply.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel L. Chen & Martin Schonger, 2023. "Invariance of equilibrium to the strategy method I: theory," Post-Print hal-04550734, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04550734
    DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00145-3
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04550734v1
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    Cited by:

    1. Leopoldo Fergusson & José-Alberto Guerra & James A. Robinson, 2024. "Anti-social norms," NBER Working Papers 32717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
      • Fergusson, Leopoldo & Guerra, José-Alberto & Robinson, James A., 2024. "Anti-social norms," Documentos CEDE 21159, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

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