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Internal governance mechanisms and corporate misconduct

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Eugster

    (UQ [All campuses : Brisbane, Dutton Park Gatton, Herston, St Lucia and other locations] - The University of Queensland)

  • Oskar Kowalewski

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Piotr Śpiewanowski

    (Institute of Economics, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw)

Abstract

This study aimed to provide new evidence linking internal corporate governance mechanisms and corporate misconduct by using a sample of 2,844 public US companies during the period 2007–2019. The results revealed that the optimal size and diversity of boards, including well-functioning audit committees, are negatively correlated with corporate violations. By contrast, it was shown that board members' independence, activity, and ownership are positively correlated with a firm's fraudulent activities. Therefore, not all internal governance mechanisms are related to reduced corporate misconduct. Moreover, the study shows that some internal governance mechanisms, such as the share of female board members, mitigate certain types of corporate misconduct.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Eugster & Oskar Kowalewski & Piotr Śpiewanowski, 2024. "Internal governance mechanisms and corporate misconduct," Post-Print hal-04549564, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04549564
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103109
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    Cited by:

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    2. Marcin Borsuk & Nicolas Eugster & Paul-Olivier Klein & Oskar Kowalewski, 2023. "Family Firms and Carbon Emissions," NBP Working Papers 361, Narodowy Bank Polski.
    3. Nguyen, Thu Ha & Pham, Man Duy (Marty) & Xiao, Yang, 2024. "How well is employee ownership working? Evidence from non-financial misconduct," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate misconduct ; Internal governance mechanisms ; Board of directors ; Committees ; Ownership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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