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Contraintes de financement et choix contractuel sur le marché du faire-valoir indirect à Madagascar

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  • Wendyam Ulrich Wilfried Zombre

    (Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CIHEAM-IAMM - Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier - CIHEAM - Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement)

  • Emmanuelle Bouquet

    (Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CIHEAM-IAMM - Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier - CIHEAM - Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement)

  • Jean-Philippe Colin

    (IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement)

Abstract

L'article s'inscrit dans le champ des travaux sur le rôle du marché du faire-valoir indirect dans le développement, en explorant l'incidence des contraintes de financement sur les choix contractuels dans la région du lac Alaotra, à Madagascar, caractérisée par un marché locatif actif et par une relativement forte implantation d'institutions financières formelles. Nos résultats suggèrent que la contrainte de financement influe sur les arbitrages entre location et métayage, et nous conduisent à proposer une interprétation de l'existence du métayage fondée sur ses propriétés de contribution au relâchement de la contrainte financière pour les tenanciers, dans un contexte de propriétaires globalement neutres au risque. En reportant le règlement de la rente au moment de la récolte, le contrat de métayage assure une fonction de quasi crédit entre le propriétaire et le tenancier, contribue à mitiger les conséquences du rationnement du crédit formel, et s'avère plus inclusif que la location pour les tenanciers pauvres.

Suggested Citation

  • Wendyam Ulrich Wilfried Zombre & Emmanuelle Bouquet & Jean-Philippe Colin, 2013. "Contraintes de financement et choix contractuel sur le marché du faire-valoir indirect à Madagascar," Post-Print hal-02748863, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02748863
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02748863
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    References listed on IDEAS

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