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Reverse tenancy in Romania: Actors' rationales and equity outcomes

Author

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  • Laurence Amblard

    (UMR METAFORT - Mutations des activités des espaces et des formes d'organisation dans les territoires ruraux - ENITAC - Ecole Nationale d'Ingénieurs des Travaux Agricoles de Clermont-Ferrand - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech - CEMAGREF - Centre national du machinisme agricole, du génie rural, des eaux et forêts)

  • J.P. Colin

    (UMR MOISA - Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - CIHEAM-IAMM - Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier - CIHEAM - Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

Following the implementation of the land reform in the 1990's, land rentals have developed in Romania, mainly in a reverse tenancy configuration. The paper provides an analysis of contractual practices in this configuration, based on empirical data collected through intensive field work in Transylvania. The paper depicts the reverse tenancy configuration and the conditions of its emergence in Romania, following the implementation of transition reforms in the agricultural sector. Characterizing the negotiation and enforcement of contracts in this configuration shows that in a situation where no effective enforcement mechanism is available, the market structure is such that tenants can choose very incomplete contracts or default on their contractual obligations. The analysis of the landowners' perspective, taking into account their perception of the contractual relationship contributes to explain why contractual practices persist in this context. The article concludes with a discussion, from a policy perspective, of the equity-enhancing role of the land lease market in such this reverse tenancy configuration.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence Amblard & J.P. Colin, 2009. "Reverse tenancy in Romania: Actors' rationales and equity outcomes," Post-Print hal-00454533, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00454533
    DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2008.10.008
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00454533
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    2. Shuai Zhou & Guangqing Chi, 2022. "Farmland Rental: The Impacts of Household Demographics and Livelihood Strategies in China," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(8), pages 1-18, August.

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