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Le métayage comme partenariat. L'arrangement a médias dans la Sierra Madré orientale

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  • Jean-Philippe Colin
  • Emmanuelle Bouquet

Abstract

[fre] Le recours au métayage est usuellement expliqué par un arbitrage entre aversion au risque et incitation du tenancier (approche Principal-Agent standard) ou entre coûts d'agence dans une situation d'imperfection des marchés autres que le marché de la terre, avec des acteurs neutres vis-à-vis du risque (approche par les coûts de transaction). Cette étude des contrats agraires au Mexique illustre une configuration où les logiques contractuelles infirment le modèle Principal-Agent standard et conduisent à analyser le métayage comme un dispositif de mise en commun de ressources dans un contexte d'imperfection des marchés, sans accorder de rôle central à l'aléa moral dans les choix contractuels. Dans la situation étudiée, le métayage relève du partenariat et non d'une relation d'agence. [eng] Sharecropping as a partnership. the a medias contract in the sierra madre oriental - Mexico - Sharecropping is usually explained by a trade-off between tenant's risk aversion and incentives (standard Principal-Agent approach) or between agency costs under various market imperfections, and with risk-neutral agents (transaction costs approach). This Mexican case-study illustrates a situation where contractual rationales refute the standard Principal-Agent model and where share- cropping can be analyzed as a resource pooling device, but without any major role given to moral hazard in contractual choice. In this situation, sharecropping features a partnership rather than agency relationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Philippe Colin & Emmanuelle Bouquet, 2001. "Le métayage comme partenariat. L'arrangement a médias dans la Sierra Madré orientale," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 261(1), pages 77-92.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_2001_num_261_1_5223
    DOI: 10.3406/ecoru.2001.5223
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecoru.2001.5223
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    References listed on IDEAS

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