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Risk aversion and technology mix in an electricity market

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  • Guy Meunier

    (ALISS - Alimentation et sciences sociales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

This article analyzes the effect of risk and risk-aversion on the long-term equilibrium technology mix in an electricity market. It develops a model where firms can invest in baseload plants with a fixed variable cost and peak plants with a random variable cost, and demand for electricity varies over time but is perfectly predictable. At equilibrium the electricity price is partly determined by the random variable cost and the returns from the two kinds of plants are negatively correlated. When the variable cost of the peak technology is high the return of peak plants is low but the return to baseload plants is high. Risk-averse firms reduce the capacity of the riskiest technology and develop the capacity of the other, compared to risk-neutral firms. In the particular case where a risk-neutral firm invests heavily in baseload technology and only sparely in peak capacity, a risk-averse firm would invest less in baseload, increase peak capacity, and increase total installed capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Guy Meunier, 2013. "Risk aversion and technology mix in an electricity market," Post-Print hal-02646565, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02646565
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2013.10.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Jeddi, Samir & Lencz, Dominic & Wildgrube, Theresa, 2021. "Complementing carbon prices with Carbon Contracts for Difference in the presence of risk - When is it beneficial and when not?," EWI Working Papers 2021-9, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI), revised 16 Aug 2022.
    7. Bichuch, Maxim & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Song, Xinyue, 2023. "Identifying optimal capacity expansion and differentiated capacity payments under risk aversion and market power: A financial Stackelberg game approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
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