IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01594032.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Agri-environmental programmes : convergence and difference between the EU and other countries

Author

Listed:
  • Francois Bonnieux

    (Unité d'économie et sociologie rurales de rennes - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, EAAE - European Association of Agricultural Economists)

  • Pierre Dupraz

    (Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, EAAE - European Association of Agricultural Economists)

  • Karine Latouche

    (Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, EAAE - European Association of Agricultural Economists)

Abstract

L'ensemble des pays étudiés, en particulier l'UE, l'Argentine, les États-Unis, le Japon et la Suisse, a mis en place des programmes de réduction des externalités négatives de l'agriculture qui sont relativement semblables. Ces programmes s'écartent du principe pollueur-payeur et se traduisent donc par un transfert du contribuable en faveur du secteur agricole. De plus, les programmes qui ciblent l'élevage hors sol sont très complexes, ce qui implique des coûts de mise en œuvre excessifs rendant leur contrôle problématique. Ils se révèlent inefficaces. La principale différence entre pays résulte du poids donné aux programmes favorisant les externalités positives dans l'UE ainsi qu'au Japon et en Suisse. Ils sont fondés sur la reconnaissance de la multifonctionnalité, qui implique l'existence d'économies de gamme dans la production conjointe de biens marchands et non-marchands. Ces programmes correspondent à une demande croissante de la société pour un environnement de qualité. Ils peuvent constituer un moyen efficace de préservation des ressources naturelles et de production d'aménités.

Suggested Citation

  • Francois Bonnieux & Pierre Dupraz & Karine Latouche, 2004. "Agri-environmental programmes : convergence and difference between the EU and other countries," Post-Print hal-01594032, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01594032
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01594032
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01594032/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francois Bonnieux & Pierre Rainelli, 1999. "Agriculture et environnement : bilan et perspectives," Working Papers hal-01594234, HAL.
    2. Adam Ozanne & Tim Hogan, 2001. "Moral hazard, risk aversion and compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 28(3), pages 329-348, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2010. "Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 281-302, July.
    2. Yano, Yuki & Blandford, David, 2008. "Use of Penalties and Rewards in Agri-Environmental Policy," 82nd Annual Conference, March 31 - April 2, 2008, Royal Agricultural College, Cirencester, UK 36873, Agricultural Economics Society.
    3. Colyer, Dale, 2004. "Environmental Regulations And Competitiveness," Working Papers 19100, West Virginia University, Department of Agricultural Resource Economics.
    4. David Colman, 2004. "Compte rendu d'ouvrage - Exploring the frontiers of agricultural economics : a review of volumes 2A and 2B of the Handbook of Agricultural Economics," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 73, pages 126-141.
    5. Lapierre, Margaux & Le Velly, Gwenolé & Bougherara, Douadia & Préget, Raphaële & Sauquet, Alexandre, 2023. "Designing agri-environmental schemes to cope with uncertainty," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    6. Meijerink, Gerdien W., 2007. "If services aren't delivered, people won't pay: the role of measurement problems and monitoring in Payments for Environmental Services," 106th Seminar, October 25-27, 2007, Montpellier, France 7948, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    7. Vergamini, Daniele & White, Benedict & Viaggi, Davide, 2015. "Agri-Environmental Policies design in Europe, USA and Australia: is an auction more cost-effective than a self-selecting contract schedule?," 2015 Fourth Congress, June 11-12, 2015, Ancona, Italy 207357, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA).
    8. Salas, Paula Cordero & Roe, Brian E. & Sohngen, Brent, 2012. "Addressing Additionality in REDD Contracts when Formal Enforcement is Absent," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124505, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    9. Ozanne, Adam & White, Benedict, 2003. "Agri-environment Policy Design With Hidden Information and Hidden Action: Input Quotas vs Input Charges," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 58196, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    10. Andrea Cattaneo, 2003. "The Pursuit of Efficiency and Its Unintended Consequences: Contract Withdrawals in the Environmental Quality Incentives Program," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 25(2), pages 449-469.
    11. Peter Bardsley & Ingrid Burfurd, 2008. "Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1031, The University of Melbourne.
    12. Kuhfuss, Laure & Jacquet, Florence, 2012. "Le dispositif des MAEt pour l’enjeu eau : une fausse bonne idée ?," Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement (RAEStud), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 93(4).
    13. Ozanne, Adam & White, Benedict, 2008. "Hidden action, risk aversion and variable fines in agri-environmental schemes," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 52(2), pages 1-10.
    14. Colyer, Dale, 2004. "Environmental Regulations and Agricultural Competitiveness," Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade, vol. 5(1), pages 1-17.
    15. Cho, Wonjoo & Blandford, David, 2015. "Bilateral information asymmetry and irreversible practice adoption through agri-environmental policy: an application to peat land retirement in Norway," 89th Annual Conference, April 13-15, 2015, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 204212, Agricultural Economics Society.
    16. Charles Palmer & Markus Ohndorf & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2009. "Life’s a breach! Ensuring ‘permanence’ in forest carbon sinks under incomplete contract enforcement," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/113, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    17. Karantininis, Kostas & Hajderllari, Eliona, 2015. "Extracting the Kyoto Rents: Nitrogen Efficient GMO Rice in China," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 211831, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    18. Ferraro, Paul J., 2008. "Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 810-821, May.
    19. Sauer, Johannes & Walsh, John & Zilberman, David, 2012. "Behavioural Change through Agri-Environmental Policies ? – A Distance Function based Matching Approach," 86th Annual Conference, April 16-18, 2012, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 134783, Agricultural Economics Society.
    20. Fortmann, Lea & Cordero-Salas, Paula & Sohngen, Brent & Brian, Roe, 2016. "Incentive Contracts for Environmental Services and their Potential in REDD," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 9(3-4), pages 363-409, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01594032. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.