Multiagent belief revision
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.05.004
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Other versions of this item:
- Billot, Antoine & Vergnaud, Jean-Christophe & Walliser, Bernard, 2015. "Multiagent belief revision," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 47-57.
- Antoine Billot & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Bernard Walliser, 2015. "Multiagent belief revision," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01175921, HAL.
- Antoine Billot & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Bernard Walliser, 2015. "Multiagent belief revision," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01175921, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
belief; belief revision; epistemic logics; game;All these keywords.
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