IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2205.00564.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strategic Behavior under Context Misalignment

Author

Listed:
  • Pierfrancesco Guarino
  • Gabriel Ziegler

Abstract

We study the behavioral implications of Rationality and Common Strong Belief in Rationality (RCSBR) with contextual assumptions allowing players to entertain misaligned beliefs, i.e., players can hold beliefs concerning their opponents' beliefs where there is no opponent holding those very beliefs. Taking the analysts' perspective, we distinguish the infinite hierarchies of beliefs actually held by players ("real types") from those that are a byproduct of players' hierarchies ("imaginary types") by introducing the notion of separating type structure. We characterize the behavioral implications of RCSBR for the real types across all separating type structures via a family of subsets of Full Strong Best-Reply Sets of Battigalli & Friedenberg (2012). By allowing misalignment, in dynamic games we can obtain behavioral predictions inconsistent with RCSBR (in the standard framework), contrary to the case of belief-based analyses for static games--a difference due to the dichotomy "non-monotonic vs. monotonic" reasoning.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierfrancesco Guarino & Gabriel Ziegler, 2022. "Strategic Behavior under Context Misalignment," Papers 2205.00564, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2205.00564
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.00564
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Perea,Andrés, 2012. "Epistemic Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107401396, January.
    2. Perea,Andrés, 2012. "Epistemic Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107008915, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrés Perea & Elias Tsakas, 2019. "Limited focus in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 571-607, June.
    2. Larbi Alaoui & Antonio Penta, 2018. "Cost-benefit analysis in reasoning," Economics Working Papers 1621, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Leonetti, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio, 2020. "Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 533-547.
    4. Sanjit Dhami & Emma Manifold & Ali al‐Nowaihi, 2021. "Identity and Redistribution: Theory and Evidence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(350), pages 499-531, April.
    5. Tsakas, Elias, 2014. "Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 126-144.
    6. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
    7. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2019. "Comprehensive rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 185-202.
    8. Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses, 2017. "Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 457-473, May.
    9. Geir B. Asheim & Andrés Perea, 2019. "Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1241-1275, December.
    10. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
    11. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "Bayesian game theorists and non-Bayesian players," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 1420-1454, November.
    12. Shuige Liu, 2018. "Characterizing Assumption of Rationality by Incomplete Information," Papers 1801.04714, arXiv.org.
    13. Shuige Liu, 2018. "Knowledge and Unanimous Acceptance of Core Payoffs: An Epistemic Foundation for Cooperative Game Theory," Papers 1802.04595, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
    14. Lorenzo Bastianello & Mehmet S. Ismail, 2022. "Rationality and correctness in n-player games," Papers 2209.09847, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    15. Jean-Pierre Corriou, 2021. "Dynamic Optimization," Springer Optimization and Its Applications, in: Numerical Methods and Optimization, chapter 0, pages 653-708, Springer.
    16. Tsakas, E., 2012. "Rational belief hierarchies," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    17. Shuige Liu, 2018. "Ordered Kripke Model, Permissibility, and Convergence of Probabilistic Kripke Model," Papers 1801.08767, arXiv.org.
    18. Perea, Andrés & Roy, Souvik, 2017. "A new epistemic characterization of ε-proper rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 309-328.
    19. Francois, Joseph & Bekkers, Eddy & Nelson, Doug R & Rojas-Romagosa, Hugo, 2019. "Trade Wars: Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition," CEPR Discussion Papers 14079, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Rohit Parikh & Çağil Taşdemi̇r & Andreas Witzel, 2013. "The Power Of Knowledge In Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(04), pages 1-28.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2205.00564. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.