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Un modèle explicatif du vote FNSEA aux élections des représentants des chefs d'exploitation aux Chambres d'Agriculture départementales (1995-2001)

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Dubois

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • François Facchini

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Martial Foucault

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, DSP - Département de science politique - UdeM - Université de Montréal, CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Abel François

    (LARGE - Laboratoire de recherche en gestion et économie - Université Louis Pasteur - Strasbourg I - Université Robert Schuman - Strasbourg III, LAEP - LAboratoire d'Economie Publique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

Cet article se présente comme une extension du champ de l'économie du vote et de ses méthodes au domaine encore inexploré des élections professionnelles. A partir d'une analyse des suffrages obtenus par la FNSEA aux élections des Chambres d'Agriculture départementales de 1995 à 2001, nous mettons en évidence plusieurs résultats. Il apparaît notamment que les variations de revenu des exploitations agricoles ainsi que le nombre de nouvelles installations influencent positivement les suffrages du syndicat, attestant une dimension égotropique et sociotropique au vote. De plus, nous mettons en évidence que les territoires de culture de betteraves soutiennent plus la fédération nationale, alors que nous ne trouvons pas de relation entre les cultures céréalières et ce vote. Enfin, le faible niveau de participation lors de ces élections donne un avantage réel pour la FNSEA.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Dubois & François Facchini & Martial Foucault & Abel François, 2009. "Un modèle explicatif du vote FNSEA aux élections des représentants des chefs d'exploitation aux Chambres d'Agriculture départementales (1995-2001)," Post-Print hal-00800701, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00800701
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00800701
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