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Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case

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  • Haldun Evrenk

Abstract

We study the Nash Equilibrium of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition when candidates differ in their non-policy characteristics (valence). If the voters' policy preferences are represented by a strictly convex loss function, and if the voter density is unimodal and symmetric, then a unique, modulo symmetry, local Nash Equilibrium exists under fairly plausible conditions. The global Nash Equilibrium, however, exists when only one candidate has a valence advantage (or disadvantage) while the other two candidates have the same valence
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Suggested Citation

  • Haldun Evrenk, 2009. "Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(1), pages 169-169, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:32:y:2009:i:1:p:169-169
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0333-9
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    1. Norman Schofield, 2007. "The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 965-980.
    2. Stokes, Donald E., 1963. "Spatial Models of Party Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 368-377, June.
    3. Hug, Simon, 1995. "Third Parties in Equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 159-180, January.
    4. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
    5. Lin, Tse-Min & Enelow, James M & Dorussen, Han, 1999. "Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 59-82, January.
    6. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156, October.
    7. Kwang-ho Kim, 2005. "Valence characteristics and entry of a third party," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(18), pages 1-9.
    8. Norman Schofield, 2005. "Local Political Equilibria," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: David Austen-Smith & John Duggan (ed.), Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, pages 57-91, Springer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Haldun Evrenk & Dmitriy Kha, 2011. "Three-candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence: stochastic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 421-438, June.
    2. Haldun Evrenk & Chien-Yuan Sher, 2015. "Social interactions in voting behavior: distinguishing between strategic voting and the bandwagon effect," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 405-423, March.
    3. Fabian Gouret, 2021. "Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich–McKelvey scaling," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(3), pages 177-226, September.
    4. Dimitrios Xefteris, 2014. "Mixed equilibriums in a three-candidate spatial model with candidate valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 101-120, January.
    5. Evrenk, Haldun, 2011. "Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 498-510.
    6. Evrenk, Haldun, 2010. "Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization," Working Papers 2010-1, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other

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