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“A comparative review of the fisheries resource management systems in New Zealand and in the European Union

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Marchal

    (LRHLR - Laboratoire Ressources Halieutiques La Rochelle-L'Houmeau - HGS - Unité Halieutique Gascogne Sud - IFREMER - Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer)

  • Philippe Lallemand
  • Kevin Stokes
  • Olivier Thébaud

    (AMURE - Aménagement des Usages des Ressources et des Espaces marins et littoraux - Centre de droit et d'économie de la mer - IFREMER - Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer - UBO - Université de Brest - IUEM - Institut Universitaire Européen de la Mer - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - UBO - Université de Brest - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This review aims at comparing the fisheries management systems existing in New Zealand and in the European Union. The involvement of stakeholders at all stages of the management process is generally more transparent and better established in New Zealand than in the EU. Both systems aim at achieving an adequate balance between sustainability and utilisation and consider the precautionary approach as a founding principle. The social objectives are probably more explicit in the EU management system. In New Zealand, B-MSY is a legal management target for all stocks in the quota management system (QMS), but management strategies were poorly explicit until most recently. In the EU, there have not been any legal management targets or strategies until 1999. Since 1999, a number of multi-annual recovery and management plans have been established, including both management targets and strategies. Both management systems include conservation and access regulation measures. The EU management measures aim at regulating fisheries outputs and inputs, and discarding is tolerated. New Zealand management is almost exclusively output-based, and discarding practices are banned. In the EU, while individual quotas (IQs) are implicit in several countries, there is no consistent pattern across Member States for allocating TACs. In New Zealand, individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are implemented, and some flexibility in catch-quota balancing is provided by a carry-over allowance and the payment of a landing tax, the deemed value, for every fish landed above quota. If rights-based management were introduced in the EU based on, e. g., the New Zealand model, we suggest that concentration rules be set in accordance with the social objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy, and also that the deemed value should be set based on science and economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Marchal & Philippe Lallemand & Kevin Stokes & Olivier Thébaud, 2009. "“A comparative review of the fisheries resource management systems in New Zealand and in the European Union," Post-Print hal-00511628, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00511628
    DOI: 10.1051/alr/2009032
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00511628v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vince, Joanna & Haward, Marcus, 2009. "New Zealand oceans governance: Calming turbulent waters?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 412-418, March.
    2. Branch, Trevor A. & Rutherford, Kate & Hilborn, Ray, 2006. "Replacing trip limits with individual transferable quotas: implications for discarding," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 281-292, May.
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    4. Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-653, August.
    5. Hatcher, Aaron, 2000. "Subsidies for European fishing fleets: the European Community's structural policy for fisheries 1971-1999," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 129-140, March.
    6. Guyader, Olivier & Thébaud, Olivier, 2001. "Distributional issues in the operation of rights-based fisheries management systems," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 103-112, March.
    7. Sanchirico, James N. & Holland, Daniel & Quigley, Kathryn & Fina, Mark, 2006. "Catch-quota balancing in multispecies individual fishing quotas," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 767-785, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick, Wesley S. & Link, Jason S., 2015. "Hidden in plain sight: Using optimum yield as a policy framework to operationalize ecosystem-based fisheries management," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 74-81.
    2. Nolde Nielsen, Kåre & Holm, Petter & Aschan, Michaela, 2015. "Results based management in fisheries: Delegating responsibility to resource users," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 442-451.

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